Proceedings of the International scientific and practical conference ―New York Global Science Conference 2026‖ (May 18-20, 2026) / Publisher website: www.naukainfo.com. – New York, USA, 2026. - 322 p.

208 intelligible essence, thereby making all those who partake in Q. Meillassoux’s lack (just as psychoanalysts may partake in S. Freud’s lack through identification with the letter of jouissance, or the ―spare part‖ [4] ) capable of overcoming correlationism and conceiving the absolute. One could say that the philosopher’s solution is a kind of ―sinthome‖ that binds together the Real, the Imaginary, and the Symbolic. After all, is the psychotic not right when he vividly describes the hallucinatory scenes unfolding before him? Can we deny the truth of the propositions he articulates if the world and its laws are absolutely contingent? Hallucinatory qualia are true and absolute, at the very least because we can find for them a non-contradictory logical-mathematical grounding in the form of a neural correlate: for example, the intensity of blood flow in the mesolimbic projection of dopaminergic neurons. Yet this mathematization itself is carried out on correlationist grounds; that is, the MRI apparatus as a gnoseological instrument is itself correlationist, and it originates in fundamental particle physics, which operates with non-absolute categories of probability and is concerned with the study of void, as well as of potential supersymmetric particles at high collider energy levels. Speculative rhetoric is the potter’s product, Das Ding, which both beholds the void of the absolute and embodies it [5] . It embodies it to the extent possible within the collision between the void of the Real and the linguo-symbolic logic of consciousness. Thus, in the theses presented above, I have attempted a psychoanalytic reconceptualization of the principal inferences of Q. Meillassoux’s speculative realism. The results of this reconceptualization account for the paradoxical title of my work: it is impossible to say with certainty whether, in the end, we remain within the bounds of Q. Meillassoux’s thought or stand opposed to the ―ontology of contingency‖ he constructed. Q. Meillassoux cannot be refuted; moreover, there is absolutely no need to do so. Rather, what matters is to recognize the psychic foundations of any possible philosophy as necessary structures of desire and as technologies of bodily investment of libido in the signifier. As I explained at the outset, every predication used in the present text, as well as its syntax or grammatical form, is subject, as I can judge at this moment, to lack — to a certain outline of the