Proceedings of the International scientific and practical conference ―Synergy of Modern Science and Education‖ (June 12-14, 2026) / Publisher website: www.naukainfo.com. – New York, USA, 2026. - 145 p.

34 the possibility of a partial easing of restrictions on Huawei [7]. However, the negotiation process remained limited to the tactical objectives of stabilizing the economic situation. Washington codified sanctions into law for human rights violations. In June 2020, the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act was signed, obliging the government to impose visa and financial sanctions against Chinese officials responsible for repression in Xinjiang [12]. In July 2020, in response to Beijing’s adoption of the National Security Law for Hong Kong, D. Trump signed the Hong Kong Autonomy Act and Executive Order No. 13936, which abolished the territory’s separate trade and economic regime and introduced sanctions, targeting individuals including Carrie Lam [1]. To counter intellectual property theft, on May 29, 2020, Trump signed a proclamation suspending entry into the United States for Chinese graduate and doctoral students and researchers who had any links to the People’s Liberation Army of China [6]. An important direction in the development of political relations was the strengthening of U.S. interaction with Taiwan. The Donald Trump administration, despite objections from the PRC, regularly approved arms sales to Taipei and supported the expansion of bilateral contacts, encouraging Taiwan to increase defense spending. The normative basis for this was provided by U.S. legislative acts: the Taiwan Travel Act of 2018 provided for the possibility of official visits by high-ranking U.S. officials to Taipei and by Taiwanese representatives to the United States, while the TAIPEI Act (Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative Act, 2020) consolidated the U.S. course of supporting Taiwan’s international participation and preserving its diplomatic ties [8; 9]. In addition to the military-political dimension, the United States intensified cooperation with the Taiwanese company TSMC: the establishment of TSMC production facilities in the United States, in the state of Arizona, was associated with the desire to reduce dependence on external production centers in the manufacturing of advanced logic chips (7 nm and smaller), which are of critical importance for defense systems, high-performance computing, artificial intelligence, and telecommunications infrastructure. In July 2020, the United States ordered the closure of the PRC Consulate General in Houston, accusing it of coordinating industrial espionage; Beijing responded in kind by closing the U.S. Consulate in Chengdu. In addition, according to a number of Western media outlets, including Reuters, in 2019 the U.S. President authorized the CIA to launch a covert information campaign on Chinese social media to disseminate facts about corruption among CCP members and criticism of the Belt and Road Initiative. According to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, in 2017–2021 the Donald Trump administration issued 15 executive orders related to policy toward the PRC, some of them indirectly, and also implemented 116 measures by various federal agencies directed at China in the fields of trade, technology, security, and investment (―the Trump Administration issued… 15 executive orders… [and] identified 116 China-related measures‖), which, in turn, indicates a transition from a policy of managing disagreements to systemic multidimensional competition [10]. Ultimately, between 2017 and 2021, the Donald Trump administration enacted a fundamental paradigm shift in U.S. policy toward the PRC, transitioning from cautious dialogue to overt institutional and ideological confrontation. Having officially designated Beijing as a strategic competitor, Washington activated mechanisms of comprehensive containment: trade wars, sanction pressure, stringent technological restrictions, and enhanced military-political support for Taiwan. This period definitively transformed bilateral relations from a model of seeking compromise into a phase of systemic, multidimensional competition. REFERENCES: 1. Hong Kong Autonomy Act, Pub. L. 116–149, 134 Stat. 660 (2020) ; Executive Order 13936 of July 14, 2020 ―The President’s Executive Order on Hong Kong Normalization‖. URL : https://www.congress.gov/116/plaws/publ149/PLAW-116publ149.pdf (accessed: 21.02.2026). 2. Joint Statement by President Donald J. Trump and President Xi Jinping of the People’s Republic of China. Mar-a-Lago, April 7, 2017. Washington, DC : The White House, 2017. URL : https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/ ( accessed: 21.02.2026). 3. National Security Strategy of the United States of America. Washington : The White House, 2017. 68 p. UR L: https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017- 0905-2.pdf (accessed: 20.02.2026). 4. Pence M. Remarks by Vice President Pence on the Administration’s Policy Toward China. Hudson Institute, Washington, DC, October 4, 2018. Washington, DC : The White House, 2018. URL : https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-vice-president-pence- administrations-policy-toward-china/ ( accessed: 17.02.2026). 5. Pompeo M. Communist China and the Free World’s Future. Remarks at the Richard Nixon