Proceedings of the International scientific and practical conference ―New York Global Science Conference 2026‖ (May 18-20, 2026) / Publisher website: www.naukainfo.com. – New York, USA, 2026. - 322 p.

205 4. The problem of Hume, which Q. Meillassoux addresses separately, is the problem of the functioning of causality in our world, which, according to the conclusions of modern metaphysics, remains constant and balanced in terms of mutability because of the action of certain hidden parameters of necessity. The world of speculative realism, by contrast, is capable of being a multiple space of Hyper- Chaos, distanced from the most categorical empiricist-positivist theories of causality. In other words, in Q. Meillassoux’s philosophy the world is susceptible to imaginative logical transformations, to imaginary experiments which, it should be noted, are characterized by the representability of the transfinite Everything, that is, the Whole [2, p. 103] . Q. Meillassoux does not merely discursively articulate the absolute; he also imagines it, endowing it with a dimension of figural imagination, which brings his philosophizing close to the construction of an unconscious phantasm. What, then, lies at the basis of these symbolically permeated images of the Whole? Should we not locate in the domain of causality the very inability of the subject to know anything about the Whole — in essence, a failure of knowledge that engenders drive precisely insofar as something within the de-absolutizing space of culture presents itself in the form of an interpellating difference? A difference grounded in an epistemic order whose missing foundation is the human being’s absolute knowledge of Nature as such. But how do we know about this absence? How can we speak about it? Rather, we can depict it in mathematical forms and numerical analogies. Desire should be thought of as a cognitive superposition in which the possibilities of its parts always exceed the overall meaning of its concrete articulation. This extra-subjective character of desire, its separation from human phenomenal existence (the well-known thesis of J. Lacan: ―I am where I do not think‖) is fully consistent with the ideas of speculative realism. Desire does not belong to the individual; rather, the individual belongs to the symbolic complexity of the system of desire. Yet desire is evidently correlationist. And that is precisely the point. 5. Q. Meillassoux’s transfinite absolutizing mathematization thus fails to take into account a more basic possibility of conceiving the absolute from the standpoint